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COMBAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE (CDAC) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Under the technical direction of the Combat Damage
Assessment Committee (CDAC) , the Combat Damage Assessment Team
(CDAT) conducted firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system
against an array of 10 tanks simulating a Soviet tank company
deployed for an attack. The CDAT used M-47 tanks stowed with
main gun ammunition, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew
mannikins to simulate the Soviet tanks. The pilots of the
A-10 aircraft used in the firings conducted firings at low
altitudes and low dive angles which simulated attack below the
altitude of effective engagement for opposing air defense net-
works employing acquisition and fire control radar. The pur-
pose of the test was to evaluate the effects of the 30mm API
anti-tank ammunition (Aerojet lot number AJD 7SA181-001) of the
GAU-8 gun under challenging conditions of engagement for the
A-10/GAU-8 system against realistically simulated Soviet main
battle tanks.
The CDAC assessed the results of the low angle cannon
firings of the A-10 aircraft against the simulated Soviet tank
company as follows:
1. Attack Parameters : The pilots of the A-10 aircraft
attacked the simulated Soviet tank company for 7 minutes 11
seconds at low altitrde and dive angles. The pilots made a
total of 13 passes, each at a primary tank target. The GAU-8
cannon has a cockpit selectable nominal fire rate of either
4200 rounds per minute or 2100 rounds per minute. The system
was set to fire at the 2100 round per minute rate during this
test. The passes resulted in projectile impacts on 9 primary
target tanks. The attack open-fire dive angles averaged 1.3
degrees for the ten passes against the targets. Open-fire
slant range averaged 2731 feet. The pilots fired 289 rounds
in thirteen bursts averaging 22 rounds and 0.69 seconds each.
2. Weapons Effects : The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system
achieved 98 impacts on the 10 tank targets. The ratio of
direct impacts to total rounds fired was a substantial 0.30.
Ricochet impacts are also capable of causing damage. If the
ricochet impacts are added to the direct impacts, the overall
ratio of impacts to rounds fired becomes 0.34. The weapon
system achieved 22 perforations of the armored envelopes of
the tanks with a ratio of perforations to total impacts of
0.22. The ratio of perforations to direct impacts is 0.26.
Many projectiles, which did not perforate armor, severely
damaged exterior track and suspension components of the tanks
as well as gun tubes.
3. Damage Assessment : The attacking A-10/GAU-8 weapon
system inflicted no catastrophic kills on tanks in the company
array. Three tanks were immobilized, of which two were depriv-
ed of the use of main armament and the other seriously
degraded in firepower. Of the remaining tanks three were
seriously degraded in mobility and firepower, three suffered
minor or insignificant damage, and one was not hit. The
effective loss of six tanks precluded continued or sustained
offensive combat by the simulated Soviet tank company.
4. Test Conditions : The target tanks were sited in
open, flat desert terrain with no cover and little conceal-
ment. Aerial weather conditions were ones of unlimited
ceiling and visibility. Shortly after the initial firing,
clouds of white dust from projectile impacts were evident.
Such conditions effectively simulated the actual obscuration
which would have been presented to the pilots in combat.
5. Results : The overall results of the test are summar-
ized in Table I.
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BACKGROUND
Since February, 1978, the Armament Directorate, A-lu Sys-
tem Program Office, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, has
conducted firing tests using the A-1U/GAU-8 system in low-
level, air-to-ground engagements of armored targets. The
tests have been conducted within the framework of the GAU-8
30mm ammunition Lot Acceptance Verification Program (LAVP) -
Airborne. The LAVP has the following objectives which apply
to the present tests:
A. To evaluate the performance of existing production
lots of GAU-8 ammunition when fired from the air
under operational conditions.
B. To evaluate the lethality of GAU-8 ammunition
against armored targets when fired at low level from
A-10 aircraft using operational tactics.
To conduct the LAVP program, the Armament Directorate has
cooperated with Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley
AFB, Virginia and, in turn, with the Tactical Fighter Weapons
Center, Nellis AFB, Nevada. Within the framework of that coop-
eration, the Armament Directorate has set up a Combat Damage
Assessment Team (CDAT) to plan and execute the firing tests
and evaluate the results. The CDAT functions under the direc-
tion of a Combat Damage Assessment Committee (CDAC) which has
prepared this report of the firing test of 30 October, 1979.
TEST PHILOSOPHY
To generate realistic data, the CDAC determined to use a
highly empirical technique of destructive testing of actual
tank targets. Tests have involved firings at individual tanks
in November, 1977 and February - March, 1978, and, more recent-
ly, arrays of vehicles in tactical formations. The experi-
mental setup for the firings of 30 October, 1979 involved the
use of a multitarget, tactically arrayed tank formation for
attack by the A-10/GAU-8 system. The CDAT elected to simulate
a Soviet tank company, as organized within a tank division, as
the target array for two attacking A-10 aircraft. As few con-
straints as possible were placed on the attacking pilots in an
attempt to develop as much realism as possible. Table II
shows the test factors which would have been ideal in the test
of 30 October, 1979 and the practical setup which was
achieved
.












e. Low Altitude attack
angle (< 6 degrees)
2. Air Defense Realism
a. Automatic cannon
firing at aircraft
b. Missile systems firing
at aircraft
c. Small arms firing at
aircraft
d. AD suppression by
aircraft
3. Threat Targets and Doctrine
a. T62/T64/T72 high
fidelity targets
b. Stowed combat loads
(in T62/T64/T72)












b. 3 0mm API
c. Nevada leather &
Desert Terrain
d. Average open-fire
range - 2731 feet
e. Low Altitude attack
angle (< 6 degrees)










































3 . Threat Target s and Doctr ine
a. Simulated Soviet Tanks
b. Stowed combat loads
(in US M-47)
c. Wooden crew manikins
d. Static combat formation
e. Stationary targets
SIMULATED GROUND COMBAT SITUATION
The firing test of 30 October, 1979 simulated the attack
by two A-1U aircraft on a Soviet tank company. The CDAC hypo-
thesized the Soviet tank company to be the lead march security
detachment for its battalion, which in turn, is the advance
guard of a larger mobile formation. The lead detachment oper-
ates approximately five kilometers in front of the Soviet bat-
talion column. The mission of the advance company is to
ensure the uninterrupted advance of the battalion and provide
security against attack. Upon meeting heavy resistance, the
company aeploys into an appropriate combat formation to reduce
the resistance, or form a base of fire for offensive action by
the remainder of the battalion.
A Soviet tank company, would probably have other units
attached to it for its support. Attached units might include
any one or all of the following elements: (1) motorized rifle
platoon; (2) engineer detachment; (3) chemical defense special-
ists; (4) 122mm howitzer battery; (5) air defense element.
The lead detachment simulated in the firing test consistea of
tanks alone. The pure tank formation was arranged in column
formation, simulating high speed travel along an axis of
advance. The tanks used in the firing test were US M-47
tanks, largely intact, containing crew manikins, and stowed
with ammunition, fuel, and oil. The tanks were not maneuvered
during the firing test and the formation remained essentially
a snapshot of the company at a single point in time.
TARGET TANKS
The most effective targets available in sufficient numbers to
simulate Soviet T-55 ana T-62 (Figure 1) tanks were the US M-47
tanks. Both of the Soviet tank models are similar in armor pro-
tection to the M-47. With the appropriate purging of the gasoline
fuel system of the US tanks, the CDAT managed to field a target
similar in survivability to the T-55 and T-62 tanks from the view-
point of ignitable internal material. Few data are available on
the Soviet T-64 and later model tanks from the viewpoints of armor
protection and the arrangement of internal components. The deci-
sion was made, accordingly, to simulate the earlier model Soviet
tanks with the readily available US tanks.
The M-47 tanks used for targets were in excellent condition
from the viewpoint of damage assessment. The exterior components
were complete and the tanks have proven to be effective targets
for the collection of exterior mobility damage. Interior compo-
nents were less complete in the target tanks. All of the most
essential items were present, e.g., main gun, engine, trans-
mission, fuel tanks, ammunition racks, etc., but other items such
as oil coolers, range finders, vision devices, and radios, have
not been present in all tanks.
The most sensitive internal items from the viewpoint of cata-
strophic kills and high percentage M and F kills are the follow-
ing, which were placed in the test tanks as noted:
Generic Sensitive Item Test Item
1. Ammunition US Cartridge, 9U-mm TP-T
2. Fuel Number 2 Diesel
3. Oil Oil in Engine, Transmission
and Drive Components.
4. Personnel Articulated Plywood
Manikins
The tanks were static during the test and their engines were
not running, with the result that the fuel and oil were much cool-
er ana more inert than would have been the case with a moving tank
or a static vehicle with its engine running. The kill ratio
achieved in the firing test of 30 October, 1979, therefore, is
probably conservative from the viewpoint of fires resulting from
ignited fuel and oil.
TEST PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS
Conduct of the test consisted of bringing together the ammuni-
tion, gun, aircraft, pilots, and combat arrayed and loaded tanks








Russian T62 Medium Tank







FIGURE 1. Russian T62 Medium
Tank
decisive elements which were fed into the test immediately prior
to the firing were the following:
1. Aerojet 30mm API ammunition
Lot AJD 79A181-001.
2. General Electric GAU-o Gatling gun.
3. Fairchild Republic A-1U attack aircraft.
4. Fighter Pilots, 66th FWS, Nellis AFB.
5. US Designed M-47 main battle tanks, combat loaded.
The combat simulation itself comprised the aerial fire and
maneuver of the attacking A-lu aircraft. A realistic way of pre-
senting the combat simulation is to outline the sequence of perti-
nent events in each firing pass. These events and the pertinent
data which the CDAT attempted to collect, in order to reconstruct
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Burst Time, Rounds Fired





Mobility (M-Kill) , and
Firepower (F-Kill) Kills
The data noted immediately above were collected through the
combined efforts of the CDAT and range personnel at Nellis AFB.
Aerojet Ordnance Manufacturing Company personnel provided the
industrial efforts required to repair, refurbish, and field the
tank targets. The CDAT applied various systematic research tech-
niques used to describe weapon effects and combat damage. The
most basic materiel used in the test/ i.e., the aircraft, gun, and
projectile are illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. The targets
were arrayed in the tactical formation of a Soviet tank company as
shown in Figure 6.
The pilots making the attack flew from the base area in a two-
ship, mutually supporting element and employed operational tactics
immediately before and during the firing passes. The pilots
approached the target area at low altitude and simulated target
acquisition with the help of a forward air controller. The pilots
then proceeded to attack the entire tank company and acquired tar-
gets at low altitudes and dive angles, simulating operation below
the altitudes for effective acquisition and engagement by opposing
air defense missile and gun systems.
FIGURE 2. U.S.A.F./Fairchild Republic A-10 Aircraft
10









































(All directions are magnetic]
FIGURE 6. Approximate Target Layout.
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DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
The damage assessment conducted by the CDAT is pre-
sented on the following pages. Appendix A contains graph-
ical and tabular information relative to the mission in
general plus summaries of the damage assessment for easy
reference.
Terms used in the damage assessment summaries are
defined in Appendix B.
Impacts on the targets were arbitrarily numbered for
identification purposes. The impacts were numbered
sequentially, first at the turret level, then at the hull
level. If additional impacts were discovered during the
combat damage assessment (as was sometimes the case) they
were given the next sequential number, i.e., no attempt was
made to "correct" the sequence. THE READER IS CAUTIONED
THAT THIS NUMBERING SYSTEM HAS NO RELATIONSHIP WHATSOEVER
TO THE ARRIVAL SEQUENCE OF PROJECTILES ON THE TARGET OR TO
THE PORTION OF THE BURST IMPACTING THE TARGET.
15
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 33
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank from an attack aspect of 090 degrees (right
side) during three firing passes at low altitude and
low dive angle. The A-10 expended 60 rounds during
three firing passes. The first two passes were
observed to have resulted in misses.
Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the




TOTAL IMPACTS : 17
Rationale for Kill Assessment:
M-Kill: A 100% M-Kill wa
13 which perforated the h
compartment penetrating o
ing the oil cooler, had i
impact 3 which perforated
drivers compartment causi
driver and assistant driv
the engine compartment ca
damage. Impacts 15 and 1
shoes, making a minor con
s attr i tr ibuted to impact
ull armor into the engine
ne valve cover (destroy-
t been installed) , and to
the hull armor into the
ng casualties to the
er . Perforation 12 into
used indeterminate
6 destroyed two track
tribution to the kill.
F-Kill: A 100% F-Kill was attributed to impact 5
which hit in the turret ring with a high probabil-
ity of jamming the turret (which had been jammed
during a previous test) and to impact 6 which per-
forated the turret causing a loader casualty. One
other perforation of the hull into the ammunition
stowage area caused indeterminate damage, since
















































TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY




The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank from an attack aspect of 093 degrees (right
side) during one firing pass at low altitude and low
dive angle. The A-10 expended 25 rounds in the firing
pass
.
2. Kill Assessment :
65% M-Kill and 95% F-Kill resulting from the
following observed effects (Figure 8):
a. Perforations : 2
b. Significant Impacts : 1
c. Insignificant Impacts: 9^
TOTAL IMPACTS : 12
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 65% M-Kill was assessed based solely on
crew casualties. Mobility was not impaired by
mechanical damage and the tank could continue its
mission after replacement of three crewmen.
b. F-Kill: A 95% F-Kill was assessed based solely on
crew casualties from impacts 6 and 7 which perfor-
ated the turret and caused casualties to the com-
mander, gunner and loader. The damage to the
loader manikin was judged not severe enough to
warrant his evacuation. Impact 8 which did not
completely penetrate the turret armor may have con-






























TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 34
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank from an attack aspect of 089 degrees (right
side) during two firing passes at low altitude and low
dive angle. The A-10 expended 29 rounds during the
two firing passes. The first pass was observed to
have resulted in a miss.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the
following observed effects (Figure 9):
a. Perforations : 7
b. Significant Impacts : 2
c. Insignificant Impacts: 5
TOTAL IMPACTS : 14
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 100% M-Kill was attributed to impacts
13 and 14 which perforated the right hull and
penetrated the fuel tank. Contributing to the
kill were impacts 8 and 10 which perforated the
right hull and caused casualties to the driver and
assistant driver, and impacts 11 and 12 which
damaged the bearings and seal of the right #2
roadwheel hub.
b. F-Kill: A 100% F-Kill was assessed based on
impacts 2 and 3 which perforated the right turret
armor and caused casualties to the commander,
gunner, and loader. The driver and assistant
driver casualties, caused by impacts 8 and 10,
contributed to the kill. One other perforation
(impact 4) damaged an inverter and the ventilation




















































TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-4 7 Tank Number 3 9
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank from an attack aspect of 090 degrees (right
side) during one firing pass at low altitude and low




No degradation in mobility or firepower (Figure
a. Perforations : 3
b. Significant Impacts :
c. Insignificant Impacts: L3
TOTAL IMPACTS : 16
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
Three perforations into the engine compartment
(impacts 11, 12, and 16) failed to penetrate the fuel





































TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY




The attacking A-10 aircraft failed to achieve any
impacts on the tank in the burst of 20 projectiles




3. Rationale for Kill Assessment:
Not Applicable.
24
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-4 7 Tank Number 7
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank during one firing pass on the right side at
low altitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 24
rounds during the firing pass.
Kill Assessment :
Less than 5% M-Kill resulting from the following




TOTAL IMPACTS : 7
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
Impact 4 destroyed one right track center guide;




























TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 41
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank during one firing pass from an attack aspect
angle of 085 degrees at low altitude and low dive
angle. The A-10 expended 25 rounds during the firing
pass .
Kill Assessment :
100% interdiction type M-Kill and 95% F-Kill
resulting from the following observed effects
(Figure 12)
:
a. Perforations : 3
b. Significant Impacts : 5
c. Insignificant Impacts: 1_3
TOTAL IMPACTS : 21
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kills: A 100% interdiction type M-Kill after
3-5 km movement was assessed attributed to cumula-
tive damage from impact 17 which perforated the
right hull armor, severed one spark plug wire
(immediate loss of power) and penetrated one valve
cover (loss of engine oil) , and from impact 14
which damaged the right #4 roadwheel causing an
oil leak. Minor damage to the track and suspen-
sion system from 4 other impacts contributed to
the kill.
b. F-Kill: A 95% F-Kill was attributed to the
results of impacts 7 and 8 which perforated the
right turret armor causing casualties to the
commander
,






























TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-4 7 Tank Number 48
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank from an attack aspect of 085 degrees (right
side) during one firing pass at low altitude and low
dive angle. The A-10 expended 31 rounds during the
firing pass.
Kill Assessment :
90% M-Kill and 95% F-Kill based on the following





Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 90% immediate M-Kill was assessed
attributable solely to crew casualties. Damage to
the right #1 track support roller hub from impact 2
was iudqed as probably sufficient to cause an inter-
diction type mobility kill during continued movement
b. F-Kill: A 95% F-Kill was assessed based solely on
crew casualties from impact 1 which perforated the
right turret armor and caused casualties to the

































TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-4 7 Tank Number 30
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank from an attack aspect angle of 0b5 degrees
(right side) during one firing pass at low altitude
and low dive angle. The A-10 expended 24 rounds
during the firing pass.
Kill Assessment:
14
lMo degradation in mobility or firepower (Figure
a. Perforations :
b. Significant Impacts :
c. Insignificant Impacts: 5^
TOTAL IMPACTS : 5
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
No damage was observed which was substantial




















TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-4 7 TANK NUMBER 4 7
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft achieved impacts on
the tank from an attack aspect of 080 degrees during
one pass initiated at low altitude and low dive angle.
The A-10 expended 29 rounds during the firing pass.
Kill Assessment :
55% M-Kill and 65% F-Kill due to the following
observed effects (Figure 15):
a. Perforations : 1
b. Significant Impacts :
c. Insignificant Impacts: 2
TOTAL IMPACTS : 3
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 55% M-Kill was assessed based solely on
crew casualtes. Mobility was not impaired by mech-
anical damage and the tank could continue its
mission after replacement of two crewmen.
b. F-Kill: A 65% F-Kill was assessed based solely on
crew casualties from impact 2 which perforated the
right turret and caused casualties to the command-
er, gunner, and loader. The damage to the com-
































On 30 October, 1979, at Nellis AFB , Nevada, the Combat
Damage Assessment Team (CDAT) conducted firings of the
A-10/GAU-8 weapon system against an array of 10 tanks simu-
lating a Soviet tank company deployed for an attack. The
purpose of the firing test was to evaluate the effects of
Aerojet lot number AJD 79A181-001 30mm API antitank ammuni-
tion for the GAU-8 gun under challenging conditions of
engagement for the A-10/GAU-8 system against realistically
simulated Soviet tank formations. The CDAT used M-47
tanks stowed with main gun ammunition, diesel fuel, lubri-
cating oil, and crew manikins to simulate the Soviet
tanks. The pilots of the two A-10 aircraft used in the
firings conducted their attacks at low altitudes and low
dive angles which simulated attack below the altitude of
the effective engagement for opposing air defense systems
using acquisition and fire control radar.
The firing test can be summarized in terms of the
following data which were collected and/or extracted from
the firings:
Aircraft Parameters
1. Open-fire Speed (average) 574 feet/sec
2. Dive Angle (average) 1.3 degrees
3. Open Fire Slant Range (average)-- 2731 feet
4. Burst Length/Rounds (averages) .69 sec/22 rds.
5. Number Passes (primary) 13
6. Target Aspects (predominantly) Right Side
Weapon Effects Target Damage
1. Rounds Fired 289 1. K-Kills
2. Impacts 98 2. M+F-Kills 2
3. Ricochets (off grnd) — 12 3. M-Kill 1
4. Direct Impacts 86 4. F-Kill
5. Perforation 22 5. Hi% M+F-Kills- 3
6. Negligible 3
These data and the more detailed base from which they
were extracted can be arranged into measures of effective-
ness for the A-10/GAU-8 system under conditions similar to
those in the firing test, i.e., empirical combat simula-
tion. The following values of effectiveness are based on
the firing test on 30 October, 1979:
35
Measures of Effectiveness
Accuracy Related Ratio: Lethality Related Ratio:
Total Impacts
=0.34 Perforations =u> 22
Rounds Fired Total Impacts
Direct Impacts = n.30 Perforations = u# 26
Rounds Fired Direct Impacts
Weapon System Effectiveness Ratio :
Tank Immobilized = q.23 Tanks K-Killed = o.OU
Passes Passes
The ten target tanks were attacked predominately from
the right side and suffered the severe damage shown in
Table I and Table A-I
.
The data and measures summarized above, and the other
data contained in this report, support several
conclusions:
1. The A-10/GAU-8 system in realistic simulation of
combat is capable of inflicting M- and F-Kills on M-47 and
similarly protected main battle tanks, e.g., Soviet T-55
and T-62 tanks.
2. The weapon system in low level attacks can perfor-
ate specifically the side surfaces of the hulls and tur-
rets of M-47 and similarly protected main battle tanks.
3. The weapon system is an effective killing agent
against the side surfaces of M-47 and similar tanks when
firing moderate length bursts of 0.38-0.94 seconds, con-
taining 11-31 rounds.
4. From the viewpoint of GAU-8 3Umm API ammunition
effects and resulting damage to combat stowed main battle
tanks, the tactic of low level attack in this firing test
was shown to be a succesful one.
36
APPENDIX A
Graphical and Summary Information
Table A-I contains a summary of the results achieved
against array 21 on 30 October, 1979. Table A-II relates
the assessment of damages in Table A-I to locations of
perforations. Table A-III summarizes the Aircraft Attack
Parameters Altitude, Attitude, Airspeed, Firing Slant
Range and Burst length for each pass on each target.
Figure A-l relates aircraft attack aspect by tank number
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The terms used in this report are defined below:
IMPACT -- Any evidence of a projectile strike against any
portion of the target. Ground ricochets striking the tar-
get were classified as "impacts".
PERFORATION -- Any rupture of the armored envelope caused
by an impacting projectile which results in a complete rup-
ture of an armored surface by the projectile or spall frag-
ments. A perforation can occur only when the armor is im-
pacted. The word "Perforation" was deliberately selected
to avoid the ambiquities which may occur through use of
the word "penetration". Behind-the-plate effects may or
may not result from a perforation.
HIT -- Any impact not classified as a perforation.
MOBILITY KILL (M-KILL) — Loss of tactical mobility result-
ing from damage which cannot be repaired by the crew on
the battlefield. A tank is considered to have sustained a
100% M-Kill when it is no longer capable of executing con-
trolled movement on the battlefield. Mobility is DEGRADED
when a tank can no longer maintain position in its forma-
tion.
FIREPOWER KILL (F-KILL) — Loss of tactical firepower re-
sulting from damage which cannot be repaired by the crew
on the battlefield. A tank is considered to have sustain-
ed a 100% F-Kill when it is incapable of delivering con-
trolled fire from its main armament . Firepower is
DEGRADED when a tank can no longer maintain its "normal"
rate-of-f ire, velocity, accuracy, time to shift targets,
etc
.
CATASTROPHIC KILL (K-KILL) — A tank is considered to have
sustained a K-Kill when both an M-Kill and a F-Kill have
occurred as the result of killing fires and explosions
from ignited fuel and/or ammunition. A tank which has suf-
fered a K-Kill is considered not to be economically repair-
able, and, by U.S. standards, would be abandoned on the
battlefield.
ATTACK ASPECT -- The angle of approach of the aircraft
with respect to the orientation of the tank with zero
degrees representing the front of the tank (gun forward)
and 180 degrees representing the rear of the tank.
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SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS — Impacts which damage systems, compo-
nents or sub-systems resulting in their destruction or
partial loss of function. This type damage contributes to
the assessed kill.
INSIGNIFICANT IMPACTS ~ Impacts which damage non-critical
structural, convenience, or accessory components and which
may result in their destruction or partial loss of func-
tion, but with no impact on mobility or firepower consider-
ations. Good maintenance practices necessitate repair or
replacement of such items at the earliest opportunity con-
sistent with accomplishment of the mission.
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